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test, where it would strike down legis-
lation "only if it [was] so unrelated to 
legitimate purpose that government 
actions were irrational." Id. (quoting 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, III S. Ct. 2395, 
2406 (1991». 
Secondly, the court identified "in-
termediate scrutiny," or "heightened 
scrutiny." For this classification to be 
sustained it "must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be sub-
stantially related to achievement of 
those objectives." Id. at 110 (quoting 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 
(1976». 
The court then recognized the third 
category involving cases where a "sus.., 
pect class" or a "fundamental right" 
was burdened. The court explained 
that the classification was subject to 
strict scrutiny and it would uphold 
such a law "under equal protection 
guarantee only if it [was] shown that 
'they are suitably tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest. ,,, Id. at 109 
(quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985». 
The plaintiffs argued that the inter-
mediate scrutiny test should apply be-
cause section 11-1 08 limits an "impor-
tant personal right." Id. at 111. The 
plaintiffs asserted that this personal 
right arose out of the common law 
right to be compensated for 
noneconomic damages. The court of 
appeals refused to apply the intermedi-
ate test on the basis that, in its view, the 
right to compensation under common 
law does not give rise to an "important 
personal right." The court stated, "a 
legislative cap of $350,000 upon the 
amount of noneconomic damages 
which can be awarded to a tort plaintiff 
does not implicate such an important 
'right' as to trigger any enhanced scru-
tiny." Id. 
The court based its position on ar-
ticle 5 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights, which said the common law 
was subject "to the revision of and 
amendment or repeal by the legislature 
of this state." Id. at 112. The court 
reasoned that just because a law was 
found in the common law does not 
mean that the legislature could not 
change it. Further, the court empha-
sized that iftheplaintiffs' position was 
adopted, every common law would 
become a personal right and applying 
the intermediate standard of review 
would prevent the legislature from 
making many laws. Id. 
The court pointed out that its deci-
sion followed the United States Su-
preme Court's ruling in Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 
U.S. 59 (1978), where the Court ap-
plied the rational basis test to a legisla-
tive cap on tort damages in nuclear 
power accidents. In that case, the 
Court stated that the law was "'a clas-
sic example of an economic regula-
tion' needed to accommodate 'the bur-
dens and benefits of economic life, '" 
and further emphasized that '''[a] per-
son has no property, no vested interest, 
in any rule of the common law.'" Id. 
(quoting Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88). 
The court of appeals further stated 
that its holding does not limit a person's 
access to the courts, as the Murphys 
argued. The court reasoned that modi-
fying the substantive law does not re-
strict access to the courts. Even if 
section 11-108 was restrictive, the court 
explained, it would be reasonable based 
upon the legislative intent of increas-
ing the availability of insurance in 
Maryland. Id. at 113-14. 
Having decided that the rational 
basis test applied in this case, the court 
viewed the statute as constitutional. 
The court looked to the General 
Assembly's reasoning for passing the 
legislation. The court noted the 
legislature's concern about the avail-
ability and cost ofliability insurance in 
Maryland, the excessive insurance pre-
miums for doctors, and the declining 
services available for patients. The 
court noted that the stated purpose of 
the law was to "assure the availability 
of sufficient liability insurance, at a 
reasonable cost, in orderto coverclairns 
for personal injuries to members of the 
public." Id. at 115. As such, it served 
a legitimate state purpose and applied 
to all personal injury claimants equally, 
ratherthan singling out one category of 
claimants. Therefore, the court held 
that the noneconomic damages cap was 
neither irrational or arbitrary. 
The plaintiffs' second argument was 
that the cap violated their right to a jury 
trial as guaranteed by articles 5 and 23 
ofthe Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
Their rights, the plaintiffs argued, were 
violated because the cap interfered with 
the jury's ability to properly determine 
damages and also interfered ''with the 
jury's exclusive province in determin-
ing factual issues." Id. at 116. The 
court rejected this argument, stating 
that, because it was decided that the 
legislature was allowed to cap 
noneconomic damages, there was noth-
ing for the judge or the jury to decide. 
Id. The right to a jury trial arises in 
cases where the result or issue must be 
decided by either the judge or the jury. 
The court held, however, that the leg-
islature had taken the issue of 
noneconomic damages out ofthe hands 
of both the judge and jury. ld. 
The holding in Murphy settles a 
long argument in the legal, legislative 
and insurance communities. The Mary-
land Legislature enacted the 
noneconomic damages cap because it 
places as a high priority on the avail-
ability of insurance to Maryland citi-
zens. The court of appeals has clearly 
decided this one issue of whether sec-
tion 11-108 is constitutional. Yet, it is 
foreseeable that more litigation will 
follow as future litigants debate issues 
regarding whether certain damages are 
economic or noneconomic, as well as 
to which cases the noneconomic cap 
will apply. 
- Elizabeth A. Lee 
Woodson v. State: HEIGHTENED 
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATION 
REQUIRED TO ADMIT CONFES-
SIONS WHICH TRIGGER 
DEATH SENTENCE ELIGIBIL-
ITY. 
In Woodson v. State, 325 Md. 251, 
600 A.2d 420 (1992), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland nullified 
petitioner's death sentence by revers-
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ing his first degree murder conviction 
and remanding the case for a new trial 
on that charge. The court held, by a 
four to three majority, that the trial 
court committed reversible error by 
admitting into evidence testimony con-
cerning petitioner's alleged jailhouse 
confession without an adequate 
evidentiary foundation. 
Testimony at trial indicated that, 
during the early morning hours of Oc-
tober 10, 1989, petitioner, Shawn 
Woodson, was one of five men snort-
ing heroin in the stairwell of a Balti-
more City apartment building. Officer 
William J. Martin of the Baltimore 
City Police Department was the first 
officer on the scene in response to an 
anonymous complaint of drug use. As 
Officer Martin approached the build-
ing with his car's emergency lights on, 
the group scattered. Two of the men 
entered an apartment, another at-
tempted to leave the building and was 
frisked and let go by Officer Martin as 
he entered the building. Petitioner and 
the fifth man, Taavon Hall, remained 
on the first floor landing of the stair-
well. 
Officer Brooks, another officer who 
had responded to the scene, testified at 
trial that as he entered the building 
through a rear basement door he heard 
gun shots. Brooks stated that he then 
saw Hall run out of the front door as 
petitioner ran down the stairs towards 
him and the rear door. When the 
petitioner encountered Brooks, a gun 
battle ensued during which petitioner 
was struck in the groin area. Officer 
Brooks was struck once in the hand and 
twice in the chest area, hitting his bul-
letproof vest. Petitioner was arrested 
as he attempted to flee out the rear 
door. 
Officer Martin was found lying in a 
pool of blood on the first floor landing 
with his service revolver snapped closed 
inside its holster. He died from two 
gun shot wounds to the head. Tests 
revealed that the handgun recovered at 
the scene, near the rear door, was the 
gun that fired the bullets which killed 
Officer Martin as well as the bullets 
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recovered from Officer Brooks's vest. 
Swabs taken from petitioner's hands 
after his arrest indicated that he had 
recently fired a handgun. 
Andre Spells testified as a state's 
witness at petitioner's trial. Spells 
testified over petitioner's objection 
that, while he was incarcerated in the 
Baltimore City jail on October 23, 
1989, his cellmate, who identified him-
self as "Shawn Woodson," confessed 
that he had shot and killed Officer 
Martin. Petitioner objected prior to 
Spell's testimony relating to the con-
fession on the basis that, absent ashow-
ing that petitioner was the same "Shawn 
Woodson" who made the confession, 
the statement was inadmissible hear-
say. While laying the foundation for 
Spells' testimony about the confes-
sion, the prosecutor twice asked Spells 
ifhe presently saw in the courtroom the 
person who had identified himself as 
"Shawn Woodson" in the courtroom 
and Spells twice responded, "I don't 
see him." To a third inquiry, Spells 
responded, "I don't recognize him, no." 
Following a bench conference, the trial 
judge allowed Spells to continue to 
testify. Spells went on to testify that 
"Shawn Woodson's" nickname was 
"Buddy," that he had a mid-body in-
jury, and that he had confessed to kill-
ing Officer Martin. 
A jury sitting in the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore City found petitioner 
guilty offirst degree murder, attempted 
second degree murder, two counts of 
use of a handgun in the commission of 
a crime of violence, and two counts of 
carrying a handgun. After waiving his 
right to be sentenced by the jury for the 
first degree murder of Officer Martin, 
the court sentenced petitioner to death. 
Petitioner appealed his conviction to 
the court of appeals pursuant to Md. 
Ann. Code art. 27, § 414 (1957, 1987 
Repl. Vol.), and Md. R. P. 8-306(c). 
On appeal, petitioner argued that 
Spells' testimony should not have been 
admitted in evidence because there was 
no evidence which linked him to either 
Spells or the alleged confession. 
Woodson, 325 Md. at 259, 600 A.2d at 
424. Petitioner claimed that, given the 
fact that three state's witnesses had 
previously identified him at trial, the 
only reasonable inference to be drawn 
from Spells' repeated testimony that 
he did not see in the courtroom the 
cellmate who had identified himself as 
"Shawn Woodson," was that the 
cellmate was not the petitioner. Id. 
Petitioner further argued that corrobo-
rative details respecting Spells' correct 
reference to his nickname and injury 
were brought out after the trial judge 
indicated that the name "Shawn 
Woodson" alone was sufficient identi-
fication evidence to support admissi-
bility of Spells' testimony. Id. Addi-
tionally, petitioner claimed that the 
state's failure to adduce any evidence, 
other than Spells' testimony, that he 
and Spells were ever cellmates required 
the exclusion of Spells' testimony. Id. 
at 260, 600 A.2d at 424. 
The state maintained on appeal that 
Spells' inability to identify petitioner 
at trial was a matter solely relating to 
the weight of the evidence and not its 
admissibility. The state argued that 
Spells did not testify that petitioner 
was not the man who had confessed to 
him, rather, his testimony merely indi-
cated an inability to recognize the 
declarant. Id. 
The court began its analysis noting 
that before an admission of guilt may 
be received in evide~ce at trial, the 
state has the burden to make a prima 
facie showing that the statement was 
made by the defendant. Whether the 
state met its burden, the court said, is 
assessed by considering the circum-
stances, including Spells' failure at 
trial to identify the petitioner as the 
person who had confessed to him. Id. 
at 261,600 A.2d at 424. 
The court of appeals reasoned that 
if believed, Spells' testimony estab-
lished that it was the petitioner and not 
Taavon Hall who had murdered Offi-
cer Martin. Such testimony implicated 
petitioner as a principal in the first 
degree for the murder of a police offi-
cer in performance of his duties and 
therefore made petitioner eligible for 
the death penalty. [d. at 262,600 A.2d 
at 425. The court emphasized that this 
was a capital prosecution, and there-
fore involved an enhanced punishment. 
It compared the case at bar to others 
involving enhanced sentencing for re-
cidivists in which it had required more 
than identical names to support a pre-
sumption of identity of person. [d. at 
264-5, 600 A.2d at 426. 
The court cited as persuasive au-
thority cases from other jurisdictions 
in which a witness attrial was unable to 
identify the defendant as the person 
who had previously confessed to him. 
[d. at261, 600 A.2dat424 (citing York 
v. State, 173 N.W.2d 693 (Wis. 1970); 
Fisherv. State, 361 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1962)). In those cases 
testimony concerning the confessions 
was admitted and the convictions were 
affinned on appeal. The appellate 
courts relied on the fact that other 
witnesses, who were present but did 
not hear the confessions, were able to 
identify the defendants at trial and place 
them in the company of the witnesses 
who heard and testified to the confes-
sions. 
Thus, the court reasoned that while 
Spells was able to identify the person 
who had confessed to him by name, 
nickname, and the fact that he had a 
mid-body injury, his failure to identify 
the petitioner at trial, combined with 
the lack of any evidence that the two 
men were together in jail, resulted in an 
inadequate evidentiary foundation to 
admit the testimony. Woodson, 325 
Md. at 263, 600 A.2d at 425. ''To 
admit such evidence," the court stated, 
"would be, for example, to sanction the 
testimony of any witness who, without 
more, claims that a voice on the tele-
phone, which he cannot recognize as 
the defendant's, identified himself us-
ing the name of the defendant, and 
confessed to the crime." [d. 
The court acknowledged that there 
is some authority that "[i]dentical 
names give rise to a presumption of 
identity of person." The court rea-
soned however, "[a]ssuming, 
arguendo, that the use of Woodson's 
name alone would raise a rebuttable 
presumption of identity, the presump-
tion was nullified when Spells testified 
that the person who confessed to him 
was not in the courtroom." [d. at 264, 
600 A.2d at 426. The court held that in 
the circumstances of the case, Spells' 
conversation was inadmissible hear-
say, and to admit it was reversible error 
requiring remand for a new trial. [d. 
It appears from the ruling in 
Woodson that when considering the 
admissibility of confessions in the con-
text enhanced sentence cases, the Gourt 
of Appeals of Maryland will construe 
the "circumstances of the case" broadly. 
Such breadth illustrates the court's dis-
tinction of the penalty as part and par-
cel of the circumstances surrounding 
the confession. 
- Chris Marts 
Molzo/ v. United States: SUPREME 
COURT CHOOSES TRADI-
TIONAL DEFINITION FOR "PU-
NITIVE DAMAGES" UNDER 
FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS ACT. 
In the wake of the intense contro-
versy surrounding his appointment to 
the nation's highest court, Justice 
Clarence Thomas wrote his first United 
States Supreme Court opinion for the 
Court's unanimous decision to follow 
tradition when defming "punitive dam-
ages" under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, 
the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA). 
In Molzo/v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 
711 (1992), the Court undertook an 
exercise in statutory interpretation by 
following deeply rooted common law 
principles requiring proof of a 
defendant's culpability before a plain-
tiff can recover punitive damages. As 
such, punitive damages under the 
FTCA are a specific category of dam-
ages, the recovery of which depends on 
proof ofintentional or flagrant conduct 
and the purpose of which is to punish a 
defendant for such conduct. 
The guardian ad litem of Mr. Rob-
ert Molzof brought an action against 
the U.S. Government after Mr. Molzof 
sustained irreversable brain damage 
that left him comatose in a Veterans 
Administration hospital as a result of 
the employees' negligence. Mr. Molzof 
sought damages under the FTCA for 
supplemental medical care, future 
medical expenses, and loss of enjoy-
ment of life. 
The Government conceded to neg-
ligence, and at the conclusion of the 
bench trial concerning only damages, 
the Federal District Court ordered the 
hospital to continue the level of care it 
had already been providing Molzof in 
addition to paying for weekly doctor's 
visits and care beyond that which the 
hospital could offer. The court re-
fused, however, to award damages re-
flecting the cost of care already avail-
able or damages for loss of enjoyment 
of life. Mr. Molzof died after final 
judgement from the district court, at 
which time Mrs. Shirley Molzof re-
sumed the action as the personal repre-
sentative of her husband's estate. 
Mrs. Molzoftook exception to the 
limitations the district court placed on 
recovery for Mr. Molzofsdemise. The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit nevertheless agreed with the lower 
court and maintained that any award 
exceeding compensation, including 
loss of enjoyment of life, was "puni-
tive in effect" and beyond recovery 
under the Federal Torts Claim Act. 
112 S. Ct. at 714. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
order to define "punitive damages" 
under the FTCA. 
The Court began its analysis by 
examining the history behind the 
FTCA. Having tolerated a laborious 
legislative process for compensating 
those individuals injured by federal 
emp loyees' negligence, Congress 
passed the FTCA. The legislation 
would allow such victims to sue the 
U.S. Government and recover through 
a limited waiver of the Government's 
sovereign immunity. The Court recog-
nized that, although state law must be 
consulted in order to determine the 
extent to which the United States can 
be held liable under the FTCA, "puni-
tive damages" would in no way recov-
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